International Trade¹

Lecture Note: Review of the CES Demand

Martín Alfaro University of Alberta

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 $^1{\rm The}$ notes are still preliminary and in beta. If you find any typo or mistake, please send it to malfaro@ualberta.ca.

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Notation

This is a derivation

This is some comment

This is a comment on advanced topics which are not part of the course (you can ignore it without loss of continuity regarding the text)

- The symbol ":=" means "by definition".
- I denote vectors by bold lowercase letters (for instance, **x**) and matrices by bold capital letters (for instance, **X**).
- To differentiate between the verb "maximize" and the operator "maximum", I denote the former with "max" and the latter with "sup" (i.e., supremum). The same caveat applies to "minimize" and "minimum", where I use "min" and "inf", with the latter indicating infimum.
- "iff" means "if and only if"
- $\exp(x)$ is the function e^x .
- Random variables are denoted with a bar below. For instance, \underline{x} .

These notes contain hyperlinks in blue and red text. If you are using Adobe Acrobat Reader, you can click on the link and easily navigate back by pressing Alt+Left Arrow.

1 Introduction

This note introduces the **constant elasticity of substitution** (**CES**) demand system. This demand system is widely used not only in International Trade, but also in several other fields such as Macroeconomics.

The popularity of the CES stems from its tractability for theoretical and empirical analysis. Additionally, it is based on homothetic preferences, whichn ensure several convenient properties.¹

2 Setup

We consider an industry that consists of a differentiated good. This good comprises a discrete set of varieties $\Omega := \{1, 2, ..., M\}$, where each variety $\omega \in \Omega$ is characterized by its price p_{ω} and a parameter $z_{\omega} > 0$ referred to as variety ω 's appeal.

We interpret appeal as broader concept than quality, capturing any non-price aspect of ω (objective or subjective) that increases the attractiveness of a variety.

Demand is derived from the decisions of a representative consumer, who allocates an exogenous expenditure y to the industry and has preferences represented by a CES utility function:

$$U\left[\left(q_{\omega}\right)_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] := \left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} \left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left(q_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},\tag{1}$$

where $\delta > 0$, $\sigma > 1$, and q_{ω} is the quantity demanded of ω . The parameter σ is known as the **elasticity of substitution**, where the assumption $\sigma > 1$ ensures that varieties are (imperfect) substitutes.

Depending on the value σ , the CES gives rise different utility functions as special cases:

- If $\sigma \to \infty$, then U is the linear utility function.
- If $\sigma \to 0$, then U is the Leontief utility function (perfect complements).
- If $\sigma \to 1$, then U is the Cobb Douglas utility function.

¹There are two common demand systems used in Economics for empirical work: the CES and the Logit demand. The latter is primarily used in Industrial Organization and resembles the CES in several respects. This is why a deep understanding the CES will help you if you ever use the Logit.

It is common to find alternative representations of the CES, as any monotone transformation still represents the same preferences. For instance, under the assumption that $z_{\omega} = 1$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$, CES is also presented as:

$$\begin{split} &U\left[(q_{\omega})_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] := \sum_{\omega\in\Omega} q_{j}^{\rho}, \\ &U\left[(q_{\omega})_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] := \left(\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} q_{j}^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}. \end{split}$$

The latter functional form is equivalent to (1) when assuming $\rho := \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}$. We chose to express the CES demand in terms of σ , as it expresses results in terms of the elasticity of substitution.

2.1 Optimal Choices

The consumer's optimization problem is

$$\max_{(q_{\omega})_{\omega\in\Omega}} U\left[(q_{\omega})_{\omega\in\Omega} \right] = \left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} \left(z_{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left(q_{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \text{subject to } y = \sum_{\omega\in\Omega} p_{\omega} q_{\omega}.$$
(2)

Solving this problem, the optimal quantity demanded of variety ω is

$$q_{\omega} = y \frac{\left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\delta} \left(p_{\omega}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}},\tag{3}$$

where \mathbb{P} is a price index defined by

$$\mathbb{P} := \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(z_{\omega} \right)^{\delta} \left(p_{\omega} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(4)

The CES utility function has no corner solutions and has a unique interior solution. To characterize the solution through the first-order conditions, note that maximizing $\left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ is equivalent to maximizing $\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}$. Hence, the Lagrangian is $\mathscr{L} = \sum_{\omega\in\Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \lambda \left(Y - \sum_{\omega\in\Omega} p_{\omega}q_{\omega}\right)$,

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.

The first-order condition for variety ω is

$$\begin{aligned} & (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{-1}{\sigma}} - \lambda p_{\omega} = 0 \\ & \Rightarrow \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{-1}{\sigma}} = -\lambda p_{\omega} (z_{\omega})^{-\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \\ & \Rightarrow \left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right)^{-\sigma} q_{\omega} = -(\lambda)^{-\sigma} (p_{\omega})^{-\sigma} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} \end{aligned}$$

where we have simplified the notation by directly referring to the optimal solution as q_{ω} .

There are M first-order conditions, one for each $\omega \in \Omega$. Take $\omega', \omega'' \in \Omega$, and divide their corresponding first-order conditions:

$$\frac{q_{\omega'}}{q_{\omega''}} = \left(\frac{z_{\omega'}}{z_{\omega''}}\right)^{\delta} \left(\frac{p_{\omega'}}{p_{\omega''}}\right)^{-\sigma} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{\omega'}q_{\omega'}}{p_{\omega''}q_{\omega''}} = \left(\frac{z_{\omega'}}{z_{\omega''}}\right)^{\delta} \left(\frac{p_{\omega'}}{p_{\omega''}}\right)^{1-\epsilon}$$

Now, fix
$$\omega''$$
 and sum over ω' ,

$$\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} \frac{p_{\omega'}q_{\omega'}}{p_{\omega''}q_{\omega''}} = \sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} \left(\frac{p_{\omega'}}{p_{\omega''}}\right)^{1-\sigma}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{p_{\omega''}q_{\omega''}} \sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} p_{\omega'}q_{\omega'} = \left(\frac{1}{z_{\omega''}}\right)^{\delta} \left(\frac{1}{p_{\omega''}}\right)^{1-\sigma} \sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} (z_{\omega'})^{\delta} (p_{\omega'})^{1-\sigma}.$$
Using that $y = \sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} p_{\omega'}q_{\omega'}$ and defining $\mathbb{P} := \left[\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} (z_{\omega'})^{\delta} (p_{\omega'})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$, we get $q_{\omega} = y (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{-\sigma} \mathbb{P}^{\sigma-1}.$

Likewise, the expenditure on variety ω is defined by $r_{\omega} := p_{\omega}q_{\omega}$, where r stands for revenue. It is given by

$$r_{\omega} = y \frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}.$$

This expression allows us to identify ω 's market share, which is formally defined by $s_{\omega} := \frac{y_{\omega}}{y}$ and given by

$$s_{\omega} = \frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}},$$

$$= \frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}}.$$
 (5)

Market shares play a crucial role for models based on the CES demand, as several key expressions can be rewritten in terms of them. Indeed, market shares can create a direct link between the model and the data.

3 CES as Representation of Differentiated Goods

The CES demand we presented allows for goods that are both horizontally and vertically differentiated. Next, we analyze each form of differentiation separately.

3.1 Horizontal Differentiation

To simplify the explanation of horizontal differentiation, let's assume that all varieties have equal appeal, denoted $z_{\omega} = 1$ for each $\omega \in \Omega$. When a good is horizontally differentiated, **each variety is perceived as unique** by the consumer. This means that there is no notion of one variety being superior or inferior to another—varieties are simply different from each other.

Furthermore, CES preferences exhibit strict convexity, a property that is known as love for variety when the number of varieties is endogenous. This feature describes the agent's attitude towards varieties that are distinct: the consumer prefers diversifying consumption across varieties, rather than only consuming a strict subset of them. Given love for variety, any new variety that becomes available will be consumed.

This approach typically applies to scenarios where individuals enjoy having different meals daily or prefer diversifying their clothing colors. This is in contrast to individuals having strong preferences for a few specific meals or colors, who may also be reluctant to trying new varieties introduced to the market.

To show that the CES represents strictly convex preferences, we need to show that indifference curves are strictly convex. Indifference curves are the combinations of goods that provide the same utility. To derive them, we use that $dU = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \frac{\partial U}{\partial q_\omega} dq_\omega$ where $\frac{\partial U}{\partial q_\omega} = \left(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} q_\omega^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} q_{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1}$. Fix the utility, so that dU = 0. Moreover, suppose that $dq_{\omega'} \neq 0$ and $dq_{\omega''} \neq 0$, with $dq_\omega = 0$ for any $\omega \in \Omega \setminus \{\omega', \omega''\}$. Then, $0 = \left[\left(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} q_{\omega}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} q_{\omega'} \right] dq_{\omega'} + \left[\left(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} q_{\omega}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}-1} q_{\omega''} \right] dq_{\omega''}.$ From this we get, $\frac{dq_{\omega'}}{dq_{\omega''}} = -\left(\frac{q_{\omega''}}{q_{\omega'}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}},$ and therefore $\frac{dq_{\omega'}}{dq_{\omega''}} < 0$. Finally, indifference curves are convex since $\frac{d^2q_{\omega'}}{(dq_{\omega''})^2} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{1}{q_{\omega''}} \left(\frac{q_{\omega''}}{q_{\omega'}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} > 0.$

The intensity in which a consumer perceives varieties as different is governed by the elasticity of substitution, σ . This parameter measures the degree of substitution of a variety relative to the rest of varieties.

As the parameter σ is constant for all varieties, the degree of substitution remains the same, regardless of the number of available variety. This implies that we rule out crowding effects: when a firm enters an industry and introduces a new variety, the degree of substitution among the varieties is unchanged.

To formally show the role of σ , consider two varieties l and m. Indifference curves are then given by

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}q_l}{\mathrm{d}q_m} = -\left(\frac{q_m}{q_l}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$

Graphically:



In particular, the indifference curve when an agent does not consume the variety m(i.e., $q_m \rightarrow 0$) is

$$\lim_{q_m \to 0} \frac{\partial q_l}{\partial q_m} = -\infty$$

The equation indicates that the consumer is willing to give up an infinitely large amount of variety l to consume a positive quantities of m. This implies that the agent finds any variety valuable, thus reflecting a preference for diversification. In particular, it determines that the consumer will always consume a new variety, regardless of the price charged.

The fact that the introduction of new varieties is valuable can be shown in an alternative way. Suppose that the agent is consuming an identical quantity \tilde{q} of each variety:

$$U_1 = \left(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \widetilde{q}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$
$$= M^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \widetilde{q}.$$

Let's compare this to a scenario where the consumption per variety is halved, but the number of varieties is doubled. Formally, the number of varieties becomes 2M and the quantities per variety $\frac{\tilde{q}}{2}$, so that

$$U_2 = (2M)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \frac{\widetilde{q}}{2}.$$

Using that $\sigma > 1$, it is easy to see that

$$(2M)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}\frac{\widetilde{q}}{2} > M^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}\widetilde{q},$$

and therefore $U_2 > U_1$. The result clearly illustrates the principle behind *love of variety*: the agent prefers a basket with a wider range of varieties, over one containing more of the original varieties.

3.2 Vertical Differentiation

When a good is vertically differentiated, the agent perceives some varieties as superior to others. This is typically seen with computers, where higher processing speeds are always preferred by consumers, all else being equal.

The intensity in which a variety is preferred is captured by the parameter z_{ω} . Formally, (1) indicates that a higher z_{ω} yields more utility from consuming variety ω .

The fact z_{ω} enters directly into the utility function explains why the variable is referred to appeal, rather than simply quality: it encompasses all non-price aspects that impact a consumer's decision. As such, appeal represents not only objective features that overhaul a variety, but also psychological factors. Overall, the model assumes that the consumer derives more utility from consuming ω when z_{ω} is higher, and we remain agnostic about why this occurs.

The terms $(z_{\omega})_{\omega \in \Omega}$ capture vertical differentiation in relative terms, rather than absolute terms. This means that what matters for variety ω is z_{ω} in comparison to $(z_{\omega})_{\Omega \setminus \omega}$. This can be easily observed by noting that any monotone transformation of the utility function still represents the same preferences. Hence, we could work instead with the following utility function

$$U\left[\left(q_{\omega}\right)_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] = \frac{\left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}\left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}}\left(q_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}}{\left(\sum_{\omega'\in\Omega}z_{\omega'}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}}}$$

This means we can express the utility function through a normalized parameter $\tilde{z}_{\omega} := \frac{z_{\omega}}{\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} z_{\omega'}} \in (0, 1)$, such that

$$U\left[\left(q_{\omega}\right)_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] := \left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} \left(\widetilde{z}_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left(q_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

The degree to which vertical aspects influence consumption is governed by the parameter δ . This parameter directly influences the appeal elasticity of demand, which is

given by

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\ln q_{\omega}}{\mathrm{d}\ln z_{\omega}} = \delta \left(1 - s_{\omega}\right).$$

Note that when firms have a negligible market share, as occurs in models of monopolistic competition, $\frac{d \ln q_{\omega}}{d \ln z_{\omega}} = \delta$.

We express q_{ω} as a function $q_{\omega} \left[p_{\omega}, z_{\omega}, \mathbb{P} \left((p_{\omega'}, z_{\omega'})_{\omega' \in \Omega} \right) \right]$. Taking logs of (3),

$$\ln q_{\omega} = \ln y + \delta \ln z_{\omega} - \sigma \ln p_{\omega} - (1 - \sigma) \ln \mathbb{P},$$

and so

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\ln q_{\omega}}{\mathrm{d}\ln z_{\omega}} = \delta - (1-\sigma) \frac{\partial\ln\mathbb{P}}{\partial\ln z_{\omega}}.$$

Taking logs of (4),

$$\ln \mathbb{P} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \ln \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma} \right],$$

and taking the derivative with respect to z_{ω} ,

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln z_{\omega}} = \frac{\delta}{1 - \sigma} \frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma}}{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma}}.$$

Finally, using (5), we determine that

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln z_{\omega}} = \frac{\delta}{1 - \sigma} s_{\omega},$$

and so $\frac{d \ln q_{\omega}}{d \ln z_{\omega}} = \delta (1 - s_{\omega}).$

In the literature, there are more specific versions of the CES that account for vertical differentiation. They can be understood as special cases by defining δ accordingly, implicitly assuming a given importance of appeal aspects for consumers.

One of these ways is by defining (1) with $\delta = \sigma - 1$, so that utility becomes

$$U\left[\left(q_{\omega}\right)_{\omega\in\Omega}\right] := \left[\sum_{\omega\in\Omega} \left(z_{\omega}q_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

Variety ω 's optimal demand implies an expenditure on ω given by

$$r_{\omega} = y \frac{(p_{\omega}/z_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}},$$

where $\mathbb{P} := \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (p_{\omega}/z_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$.

This variant of the CES utility captures scenarios where consumers decide according to the price per unit of quality provided by the variety.

4 Price Elasticity of Demand

The price elasticity of variety ω is defined by

$$\varepsilon_{\omega} := -\frac{\mathrm{d}q_{\omega}/q_{\omega}}{\mathrm{d}p_{\omega}/p_{\omega}} := -\frac{\mathrm{d}\ln q_{\omega}}{\mathrm{d}\ln p_{\omega}}$$

where $q_{\omega}(p_{\omega},\mathbb{P})$ is given by (3). Since \mathbb{P} depends on p_{ω} due to (4), we get

$$\varepsilon_{\omega} := -\left[\frac{\partial \ln q_{\omega}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} + \frac{\partial \ln q_{\omega}}{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}} \frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}}\right].$$

which equals

 $\varepsilon_{\omega} = \sigma - (\sigma - 1) s_{\omega}. \tag{6}$

Taking logs of (3),

 $\ln q_{\omega} = \ln y + \delta \ln z_{\omega} - \sigma \ln p_{\omega} - (1 - \sigma) \ln \mathbb{P},$

and so

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\ln q_{\omega}}{\mathrm{d}\ln p_{\omega}} = -\sigma - (1-\sigma) \,\frac{\partial\ln\mathbb{P}}{\partial\ln p_{\omega}}$$

Taking logs of (4),

$$\ln \mathbb{P} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \ln \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma} \right]$$

and derivating with respect to p_{ω} ,

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial p_{\omega}} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \frac{(1 - \sigma) (z_{\omega})^{\sigma} (p_{\omega})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma}},$$
$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} = \frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma}}{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1 - \sigma}}.$$

Finally, using (5), we determine that

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} = s_{\omega},$$

and the result follows.

Equation (6) implies that a firm with higher market share faces a less elastic demand. Thus, the CES parsimoniously captures market power through a firm's market share. Likewise, (5) reveals that a lower price or a higher appeal commands a higher market share.

Note that s_{ω} affects the price elasticity through the term $\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} = s_{\omega}$. Moreover, we know that the price index represents the aggregate conditions of the market. Both aspects entail that the strength of firm ω 's impact on the industry conditions depends on its market share.

This fact has important implications for models with a continuum of varieties. In that case, the effect of ω 's price on the price index is negligible, implying that

$$\varepsilon_{\omega} = \sigma$$

Consequently, when the number of varieties is infinite, the price elasticity of demand equals the elasticity of substitution.

5 Welfare

It can be shown that the CES utility function represents homothetic preferences, thereby exhibiting various additional properties. One of them is that the indirect utility function can be expressed as real income, $\frac{y}{p}$.

Formally, this means that we can always define real numbers \mathbb{Q} and \mathbb{P} , such that $\mathbb{QP} = y$ and where \mathbb{Q} is the indirect utility function V. In the particular case of the CES, \mathbb{Q} and \mathbb{P} are given by

$$\mathbb{Q} := \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} q_{\omega}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$
$$\mathbb{P} := \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\delta} \left(p_{\omega}\right)^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

where \mathbb{Q} uses the optimal demands given by (3).

The fact that $\mathbb{QP} = y$ justifies why \mathbb{Q} is referred to as a **quantity index** and \mathbb{P} as a **price index**: \mathbb{Q} can be interpreted as a representative basket of varieties, whereas \mathbb{P} would be the necessary income to buy one unit of this basket.

 $\mathbb{QP} = y$ additionally implies that

$$\mathbb{Q} = \frac{y}{\mathbb{P}},$$

where \mathbb{Q} equals the consumer's indirect utility function. This establishes that one unit of utility corresponds to one unit of \mathbb{Q} , so that V = 1 is equivalent to $\mathbb{Q} = 1$. Based on this result, \mathbb{P} also reflects the consumer's valuation of the basket, **as it constitutes the minimum expenditure that is necessary to achieve one unit of utility**. In formal terms, $\mathbb{Q} = 1$ when income is given by $y = \mathbb{P}$, implying that $V = 1.^2$

We can prove directly the indirect utility function equals real income. The indirect utility function V corresponds to the utility function evaluated at the optimal quantities: $V = \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ $\Rightarrow V = \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta}(p_{\omega})^{-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}y\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ $\Rightarrow V = \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{(z_{\omega})^{\delta}(p_{\omega})^{-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}y\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ $\Rightarrow V = \left[\left(\frac{y}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ $\Rightarrow V = \left(\frac{y}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}\right) \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ Given that $\mathbb{P} := \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$ and hence $\left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} = \mathbb{P}^{-\sigma}$, then $V = \left(\frac{y}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}}\right) \mathbb{P}^{-\sigma} = \frac{y}{\mathbb{P}}$ and the result follows.

5.1 Welfare Determinants

To keep matters simple, suppose that the prices and quality of each variety are the same. Formally, let $p_{\omega} = \overline{p}$ and $z_{\omega} = \overline{z}$ for each ω . Then, the price index given by (4) is

$$\mathbb{P} = \left[\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} (z_{\omega})^{\delta} (p_{\omega})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$
$$= M^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} (\overline{z}_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{1-\sigma}} \overline{p}_{\omega}.$$

Therefore, welfare is

$$\frac{y}{\mathbb{P}} = \mathbb{Q} = \frac{y}{M^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} (\overline{z}_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{1-\sigma}} \overline{p}_{\omega}},\tag{7}$$

where the powers of M and \overline{z}_{ω} are negative since we suppose $\sigma > 1$.

One unit of the quantity index (i.e., one basket of goods) represents one unit of real income, and hence one unit of utility. Likewise, the price index represents the necessary income to obtain one unit of utility, thereby representing the consumer's valuation for one unit of the basket. An implication of this is that **the lower the price index**, **the lower the income you need to obtain one unit of utility**. Consequently, **a lower price index reflects a higher consumer's valuation of the basket**.

²The price index also plays another role. To see this, denote the Lagrange multiplier of the optimization problem (2) by λ^* . Remember that $\lambda^* := \frac{\partial V}{\partial y}$ due to the Envelope Theorem, and so λ^* is the marginal utility of income: the impact on optimal utility of one additional unit of income. The relation between λ^* arises since $\lambda^* = \frac{1}{\mathbb{P}}$, so that $\frac{1}{\mathbb{P}}$ is the marginal utility of income.

Due to this result, the determinants of the price index completely identify the factors determining the valuation of the basket. Applying logarithms to the definition of the price index,

$$\mathbb{P} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \ln M + \frac{\delta}{1 - \sigma} \ln \overline{z}_{\omega} + \ln \overline{p}_{\omega},$$

so that

- ∂lnℙ/∂lnM < 0: a higher number of varieties decreases the price index, and is hence welfare improving. It reflects that a basket with more varieties is more valuable, as it represents a more diversified basket.
- $\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln \overline{z_{\omega}}} < 0$: a higher appeal of varieties decreases the price index, which increases welfare.
- $\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln \overline{z}_{\omega}} > 0$: a higher price of varieties increases the price index, which reduces welfare.

Note that σ affects the impact of the number of varieties on welfare, as σ captures the intensity in which the consumer loves variety. Specifically, applying logs to \mathbb{Q} and taking the derivative,

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \ln M} = \frac{1}{\sigma - 1}.$$

This establishes that the impact of M on \mathbb{Q} is lower when σ is higher. The outcome reflects that consumer perceives varieties as less differentiated when σ is higher. In the limit, where $\sigma \to \infty$, the utility function becomes linear, representing a scenario where varieties are seen as perfect substitutes. This explains why $\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \ln M}\Big|_{\sigma \to \infty} = 0$, as consumption diversification has no value when varieties are perfect substitutes—the consumer's sole concern is total consumption, without caring about whether one or multiple varieties are consumed.

6 A Continuum of Goods

While we have assumed a discrete number M of varieties, it is standard to work with a continuum of varieties. This entails that the number of varieties is infinite, with every

point in the interval [0, M] representing a different variety.³

The assumption is in particularly adopted in models of monopolistic competition, implying that every variety is negligible for an industry's aggregate conditions. In terms of the CES, this is captured by saying that no firm in isolation is capable of affecting the price index.

Formally, the utility function is

$$U := \left[\int_0^M (z_\omega)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

The optimization problem is now

$$\max_{(q_{\omega})_{\omega\in[0,M]}} U := \left(\int_{0}^{M} (z_{\omega})^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_{\omega})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathrm{d}\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \mathrm{subject to } y = \int_{0}^{M} p_{\omega} q_{\omega} \mathrm{d}\omega,$$

with the same solution as before

$$q_{\omega} = y \frac{\left(z_{\omega}\right)^{\delta} \left(p_{\omega}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\mathbb{P}^{1-\sigma}},$$

but with the difference that the price index in the continuum version is

$$\mathbb{P} := \left[\int_0^M (z_\omega)^\delta (p_\omega)^{1-\sigma} \, \mathrm{d}\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Likewise, the indirect utility function is the same as in the discrete case:

$$V\left(\mathbb{P}\right) = \frac{y}{\mathbb{P}}.$$

The optimization problem can be used the solution for the discrete case, and then extending it for a continuum of goods. Alternatively, we can use either calculus of variation or optimal control.

Regarding the former, consider the solution q_{ω} and an additive perturbation δq_{ω} . This implies that the Lagrangean can be expressed in terms of $q_{\omega} + \delta q_{\omega}$ by,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathscr{L} &:= \int_0^M \left(z_\omega \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left[q_\omega + \delta q_\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \, \mathrm{d}\omega + \lambda \left(Y - \int_0^M p_\omega \left[q_\omega + \delta q_\omega \right] \, \mathrm{d}\omega \right) \\ \frac{\partial \mathscr{L}}{\partial \delta} &= \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \left(z_\omega \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} \left[q_\omega + \delta q_\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - 1} q_\omega - \lambda q_\omega p_\omega = 0 \\ \end{aligned}$$
Evaluating the solution at $\delta = 0$,

$$\Rightarrow \left. \frac{\partial \mathscr{L}}{\partial \delta} \right|_{\delta = 0} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \left(z_{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}} \left[q_{\omega} \right]^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - 1} q_{\omega} - \lambda q_{\omega} p_{\omega} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \left. \frac{\partial \mathscr{L}}{\partial \delta} \right|_{\delta=0} = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \left(z_{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}} \left[q_{\omega} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} - \lambda p_{\omega} = 0 \text{ for all } \omega \in [0, M]$$

which gives the same expression as the first-order condition we derived.

Consider the optimal-control problem. Suppose we define an auxiliary variable $Y^{R}(\omega)$, which is the residual income after consuming good ω . The variable Y^{R} is constrained to $Y^{R}(0) = Y$ and $Y^{R}(M) = 0$. Hence, we can express

³It is common to say that there is as a continuum of goods with measure M. This is analogous to say that in the interval [0, 1] there are an infinite number of goods, but the length of the line is equal to 1 and so the measure of goods equals one.

the control variable as $\frac{dY^R}{d\omega} = -p_\omega q_\omega$, since each good reduces the residual demand. The Hamiltonian is $\mathscr{H} := (z_\omega)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \lambda (-p_\omega q_\omega)$ So taking the first order conditions $\frac{\partial \mathscr{H}}{\partial q_\omega} = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} (z_\omega)^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma}} (q_\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} - \lambda p_\omega = 0$ for each $\omega \in [0, M]$, which provides the same solution.

One convenient feature of the continuum case is that no firm in isolation can influence aggregate variables. For instance, the price elasticity of demand for ω is

$$\varepsilon_{\omega} := -\left[\frac{\partial \ln q_{\omega}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} + \frac{\partial \ln q_{\omega}}{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}} \frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}}\right]$$

But, since each firm is negligible for the aggregate conditions, $\frac{\partial \ln \mathbb{P}}{\partial \ln p_{\omega}} = 0$ and therefore

$$\varepsilon_{\omega} = \sigma.$$

7 CES from a Random Utility Model (OPTIONAL)

Our previous derivation of the CES demand relied on a representative consumer with love for variety. However, this is not the only approach to derive a CES demand. Moreover, each of these approaches gives rise to alternative interpretations of the demand parameters.

In particular, we will show that the CES demand can also emerge from a random utility model, where the desire for diversification stems from an *ideal-variety* interpretation. This framework assumes heterogeneous preferences among consumers, leading them to demand different varieties in equilibrium. Thus, the aggregate demand exhibits a diversified consumption.

For instance, this reflects what occurs in the football jersey market, where we could segment a country's population based on their favorite team (e.g., Barcelona, Real Madrid, Sevilla). Aggregating the individual demands, all jerseys would be demanded, resulting in diversified aggregate consumption.

To formalize this idea, consider a continuum of agents with mass L, and a set of varieties $\Omega := \{1, 2, ..., N\}$. Each consumer makes two choices: which variety to consume and the quantities of it. Unlike the representative-consumer approach, consumers are **constrained to buy only one variety**, although they can buy as much as they wish of the variety chosen. This feature explains why the particular random-utility model

considered is known as involving discrete-continuous choices.

The population of consumers exhibits heterogeneous preferences for each variety. This is formalized by an indirect utility of variety ω given by

$$V(y, p_{\omega}) := \ln y - \ln p_{\omega} + \underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega}$$
 for each $\omega \in \Omega$,

where $\underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega}$ is a random variable. We suppose that each $\underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega}$ is iid Gumbel distributed, with standard deviation $\mu_{\overline{6}}^{\pi}$ where $\mu > 0.^{4}$ Note that a higher value for μ increases the variance, and hence represents greater dispersion of tastes within the population. This entails that μ reflects the degree of heterogeneity in the preferences of consumers.

Conditional on choosing ω , the quantity consumed can be obtained by Roy's identity: $q_{\omega} = -\frac{\partial V(y,p_{\omega})/\partial p_{\omega}}{\partial V(y,p_{\omega})/y}$, implying that

$$q_{\omega}\left(p_{\omega},y\right) = \frac{y}{p_{\omega}}.$$

Once we determine the quantity consumed for each ω , we need to determine which variety will be chosen. To do this, let α_{ω} (**p**) denote the proportion of consumers selecting variety ω when prices are **p**. This term also corresponds to the probability of ω yielding the highest indirect utility. Formally,

$$\alpha_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p}\right) := \Pr\left[\left(\ln y - \ln p_{\omega} + \mu \underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega} \ge \ln y - \ln p_{\omega'} + \mu \underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega'}\right) \left(\forall \omega' \in \Omega\right)\right].$$

By properties of the Gumbel distribution, $\alpha_{\omega}(\mathbf{p})$ has the following closed-form solution:

$$\alpha_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p}\right) = \frac{\exp\left(\frac{\ln p_{\omega}}{\mu}\right)}{\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} \exp\left(\frac{\ln p_{\omega'}}{\mu}\right)} \Rightarrow \alpha_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p}\right) = \frac{\left(p_{\omega}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}}}{\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} \left(p_{\omega'}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}}}.$$

Thus, the aggregate demand is defined by

$$Q_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p},y\right) := L\alpha_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p}\right)q_{\omega}\left(p_{\omega},y\right),$$

which equals

$$Q_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p},y\right) = L \frac{\left(p_{\omega}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}}}{\sum_{\omega'\in\Omega}\left(p_{\omega'}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}}} \frac{y}{p_{\omega}} \Rightarrow Q_{\omega}\left(\mathbf{p},y\right) = L y \frac{\left(p_{\omega}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}-1}}{\sum_{\omega'\in\Omega}\left(p_{\omega'}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\mu}}}.$$

⁴The results we show would have been identical if we had defined the indirect utility function by $V(y, p_{\omega}) := \ln y - \ln p_{\omega} + \mu \underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega}$ and assume that $\underline{\varepsilon}_{\omega}$ is iid and with a Gumbel distribution that has zero mean and unit variance.

A direct link to the CES demand can be established by defining $\sigma := \frac{1+\mu}{\mu}$, which determines $Q_{\omega}(\mathbf{p}, y) = Ly \frac{(p_{\omega})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} (p_{\omega'})^{1-\sigma}}$. In this model, σ does not correspond to the elasticity of substitution. Instead, μ measures the degree of taste heterogeneity within the population. In particular, $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \mu} > 0$, so that a higher σ reflects less heterogeneity.